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My recent article in the Iowa Law Review shows that the Supreme Court's
landmark ruling in Boumediene v. Bush relied on a demonstrably incorrect
understanding of key precedents known as the Insular Cases, which arose
from actions of the United States military and the new civil governments of
the islands acquired by the United States at the turn of the twentieth
century-Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Hawaii, and for a time Cuba.' The
Boumediene Court claimed that the Insular Cases held that the Constitution
protects noncitizens outside the sovereign territory of the United States
under a flexible, "practical," multi-factor balancing test premised on the
degree of "de facto" "control" that the United States government exercises
in a given place and over a given person.2 But, as my article demonstrates, a
century ago when the Insular Cases were decided literally no one-no
member of the Supreme Court, no counsel arguing before the Court, no
members of Congress or Executive branch lawyers who opined on the issue,
no prominent legal commentators who wrote on the issue-understood the
Insular Cases in that way. Instead, it was essentially undisputed that the
Constitution did not provide protections to any noncitizens outside the
sovereign territory of the United States-even when the territory was
governed by the United States, as Cuba was during the temporary military
occupation. Furthermore, the Court held that even in a newly acquired de
jure United States territory like Puerto Rico, a military government
controlled by the international laws of war but not the Constitution could
continue until and unless Congress established a civil government.
* Associate Professor, Fordharn Law School. Thanks to Ethan Leib for helpful
comments on a prior draft of this reply. Thanks also to Steve Vladeck for his thoughtful
response to ry article.
1. Andrew Kent, Bournediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Cous Misreading of the Insular
Cases, 97 lowA L. REv. 101 (201 i).
2. Bounediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 762-66 (2o08).
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It is hard for me to find much fault with Professor Stephen Viadeck's
generous response essay because he concludes that "the bulk of Professor
Kent's historical work seems irrefutable," and "wholeheartedly agree[s]"
with my analysis showing "that the Insular Cases do not support the
extension of constitutional rights to non-citizens and/or 'military enemies'
outside the territorial United States."
II.
Professor Vladeck does identify two disagreements with me, however,
one of which I take up in some detail in this reply. First, Professor Viadeck
thinks that I over-read Boumediene and Munaf v. Geren, concerning habeas for
detainees in the Iraq conflict,4 when I assert that they represent important
new departures in United States law that presage a future extension by the
Court of constitutional rights to noncitizens worldwide> Professor Vladeck
points out that the D.C. Circuit has, to date, read Bonmediene in a more
measured fashion.s He is right about the D.C. Circuit, and his prediction
about the future trajectory of Supreme Court decisions may prove more
prescient than mine. With its changing membership and the ever-dynamic
institutional, legal, and political contexts in which it decides cases, it is hard
to predict the Court's future.
Professor Vladeck's second disagreement with me concerns a
distinction he draws between habeas corpus, protected by the Constitution's
Suspension Clause,' and individual constitutional rights like due process,
equal protection, and the like. Professor Viadeck contends that habeas is
available even to people who lack individual constitutional rights because
habeas is not, properly understood, an individual constitutional right at all.8
It is rather a structural principle of the Constitution that primarily enforces
the separation of powers between the branches of the federal government,
and only secondarily protects individual liberty interests. As Professor
Vladeck writes, "habeas is not a right; it is a remedy, and one the availability
of which in no way turns on whether or to what extent other constitutional
protections apply." Professor Viadeck contends that during the era of the
Insular Cases the Supreme Court never confronted questions about the
potential extraterritorial reach of the Constitution's Suspension Clause.U
3. Stephen I. Vladeck, Insular Thinking About H1abeas, 97 IOWA L. Riw. Bit. 16, 18
(2012), http://mw.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB97_Vladeck.pdf.
4. Munafv. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
5. Vladeck, sufna note 3, at 18.
6. Id. at 20-22.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
8. Vladeck, supra note 3, at 19.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 19-20.
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Boumediene can be wrong about the Insular Cases but still right that habeas
corpus is constitutionally required for detainees at the nonsovereign
territory of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, according to Vladeck.
A.
In a narrow sense, Profesor Vladeck is correct that habeas is a right not
a remedy and its "availability ... in no way turns on whether or to what
extent other constitutional protections apply."" But I believe his claim is
mistaken, as a historical matter, in a more fundamental sense. True, the writ
of habeas corpus is more in the nature of a remedy (release from detention)
than a right. True, the habeas statute has long allowed courts to free
detainees who are held in violation of United States statutes and treaties, not
just in violation of constitutional rights. True, whether one has an individual
constitutional right under, say, the Takings Clause, does not itself somehow
control or determine whether one may invoke the writ of habeas corpus.
But-and here is the crucial point-whether one has a right to the habeas
corpus remedy has, historically, been determined by the exact same inquiry
that determined whether one has other individual constitutional rights. That
inquiry was whether the individual was within the protection of the laws or
not. If a person was within protection of the laws, he could invoke habeas
corpus and was also protected by other individual constitutional rights like
the Due Process Clause. If the person was not within protection, he had no
access to habeas and no entitlement to individual constitutional rights.,,
Protection was the key, and protection treated habeas the same as all other
constitutional rights and remedies. Subsequent to the Insular Cases, in a
controversial 1942 decision, the Supreme Court severed the link between
protection and habeas corpus.1 If this more recent doctrine is accepted, it is
not clear to what role the principle of protection should play today. But
historically, before the mid-twentieth century, the role of protection was
fundamental."i
i. Id. at ig (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c (3) (2oo6)). But see HaIndi v. Rurnsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 525 (2004) (plurality opinion) (stating that "the Due Process Clause . . . informs the
procedural contours of' of habeas corpus for a U.S. citizen detained by the military in the
United States); id. at 555-57 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the close relationship between
"due process as the right secured, and habeas corpus as the instrument by which due process
could be insisted upon by a citizen illegally imprisoned").
12. See Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLU M. L. REV. 1823 (2oog); Kent, sulna
note t, at 124-32; Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws o War During the Civil War, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1839, 1853-6o (2010); Andrew Kent, The Courts alefW/ Turn in Ex parte
Quirin, the Nazi Saboteur Case, 66 VAND. L. REv. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Kent, Court's
Fateful Tutr].
13. See sources cited supra note 12.
14. See generally Kent, Cout Is Falefal Turn, supra note 12.
15. I do not want to appear to suggest that the disagreement I have with Professor Vladeck
can be resolved easily in my favor. As I understand it, Professor Vladeck's views are rooted in an
36 [Vol. g7:34
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B.
I also take issue with Professor Viadeck's suggestion that during the era
of the Insular Cases the Supreme Court never confronted questions bearing
on the potential extraterritorial reach of the Constitution's Suspension
Clause. As it happens, there are a few cases from which we might be able to
infer the views that the Supreme Court (and the Executive branch) had
about the territorial scope of the Suspension Clause. Several times the Court
refused to intervene in habeas cases arising in various insular territories
during time periods in which Executive courts were functioning but
Congress had not provided any statutory mechanism for review in Article III
courts. Though it did not issue fully reasoned opinions, it is seems apparent
that the Supreme Court believed it had no jurisdiction because Congress
had not granted it. If the Court thought that the Suspension Clause
positively required Congress to provide habeas jurisdiction, one would have
expected to the Court to say so in at least one of the cases. It did not.
Two of the cases, which arose in Puerto Rico, were discussed in my
article on the Insular Cases.' On April I I, 1899, Puerto Rico was formally
annexed to the United States when the Treaty of Paris went into effect.,,
Prior to this date, the President governed the territory through his war
powers, and the Supreme Court confirmed this was lawful and that the
Constitution did not then protect persons in Puerto Rico.'9 Even after
Puerto Rico was annexed, the President's military government had to
continue because Congress did not get around to creating a civil
government for the island until May igoo. During this interim period, the
island was at peace and under the dejure sovereignty and complete de facto
control of the United States, but because Congress had not acted the Court
approved the continuance of the President's military government.0 In mid-
1899, the military governor of Puerto Rico created a military tribunal which
he called the "United States Provisional Court for the Department of Porto
understanding of the history of habeas corpus in Britain prior to the American Founding, as set
forth in important work by two eminent historians. See PA L D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS:
FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010); Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Susipemnsion Clause:
English Text, Iperial Contexts, and American Anlications, 94 VA. L. REv. 575 (ioo8); see also
Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revision, 124 HARV. L. REv. 941 (2011) (reviewing
HALLIDAY, supra). The historical questions are hard. Both Professor Hamburger and I have
separately taken issue with the Halliday-White-Vladeck views on habeas corpus and the principle
of protection in British history. See Hamburger, supra note 12; Kent, Courl's Faleful Turn, supra
note i 2. Boutnediene, with its focus on separation of powers rather than individual status as
determining the reach of the writ, sided with Halliday, White and Vladeck.
i6. Vladeck, supra note 3, at 19.
17. Kent, supra note i, at 139 n.157.
18. Id. at 1333-4.
19. Id.at 134-36.
o. Id. at 138-39.
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Rico."" On two occasions, convictions of this court were brought to the
United States Supreme Court for review.
In one case, Ex parte Baez, the Supreme Court denied an application for
leave to file a habeas corpus petition and for a writ of certiorari to bring up
the record of Ramon Baez's criminal conviction in the Provisional Court.22
Baez alleged in his filing with the Supreme Court that he had requested a
grand jury indictment and petit jury trial, but both had been
unconstitutionally refused by the Provisional Court.2 Among other things,
the Solicitor General's brief maintained that Congress had made "[n]o
provision whatever ... for extending the judicial power of the United States
over Puerto Rico," "[t]he island has not been erected into a separate judicial
district, nor has it been included in any existing judicial district," and so
people and institutions in Puerto Rico were not "within the territorial
jurisdiction" of the Supreme Court.24 Statutes descended from section 14 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that the Supreme Court, lower federal
courts and the individual judges and justices had the "power to issue writs of
habeas corpus," and all other necessary writs, within "their respective
jurisdictions."2i In essence, the Executive argued that Puerto Rico was not
within the statutoryjurisdiction of the Supreme Court because Congress had
not so provided. Faced with these difficult issues, the Supreme Court punted
in an unconvincing, technical fashion.t
At the time, federal district and circuit courts also lacked statutory
jurisdiction over Puerto Rico; in other words, it was clear that Mr. Baez had
no access to an Article III court to review his criminal convictions and on-
going detention by a military court. The Supreme Court's apparent
unconcern is hard to understand if Boumediene is correct that the
Constitution positively requires habeas corpus to be available in Article III
courts for noncitizens in nonsovereign or quasi-sovereign territory that is
under the total de facto jurisdiction and control of the United States. At the
time, Puerto Rico was de jure United States territory and the still the Court
did not intervene.
Cases also came to the Supreme Court from the Panama Canal Zone.
One of them raised issues of habeas, judicial power, and territoriality in a
particularly acute fashion-in a capital case briefed by one of the most
prominent lawyers in America. But the Court still showed no concern about
the lack of access to Article III review.
21. Id. at 138.
22. 177 U.S. 378 (1900).
23. Id. at 385.
24. Brief for the United States at 4-5, Exparte Baez, 177 U.S. 378 (1900) (No. ).
25. U.S. Rev. Stat. § 751 (2d ed, 1878) (habeas corpus); id. § 752 (habeas corpus); id. §
716 (all other necessary writs).
26. See Kent, supra note i, at 139 n.157.
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By a 1903 treaty, Panama granted "to the United States in perpetuity
the use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water for
the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of said
Canal."" The President governed the Canal Zone as a military reservation
under the direction of the Secretary of War and, beneath him, the Isthmian
Canal Commission.2 Congress ratified this structure by vesting in the
President and his appointees all necessary powers to create and run a
government, until Congress superseded it.2m The President then issued
"instructions" to the Commission which declared a bill of rights for
inhabitants of the Canal Zone; petit and grand jury guarantees were not
included.,o The Commission created trials courts and a Supreme Court of
the Canal Zone., Congress considered but did not act on bills which would
have given federal courts in the United States jurisdiction to review cases
arising in Canal Zone courts.
Under this legal architecture, a British national named Adolphus
Coulson, born in the West Indies, was found guilty in the Canal Zone courts
of poisoning his wife. The Supreme Court of the Canal Zone affirmed his
conviction, over his objection that his constitutional rights, including the
right to a grand jury indictment and petit jury trial, had been violated.32
Somehow, probably through the intervention of the British diplomatic
corps, Coulson obtained the services of one of the most eminent private
lawyers in America, Moorfield Storey of Boston. He was formerly president
of the American Bar Association and soon to be president of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Storey and his team
quickly petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of error to
bring up the case for review. The case was ordered docketed by the Chief
Justice.=
27. Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, U.S.-Pan., art. II, Nov. 18, 1903, 33 Stat. 2234. Article III
provided further that "The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power
and authority within the zone mentioned and described in Article II of this agreement ...
which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory . . . ."
28. See Letter from the Secretary of War to the President (Jan. 12, 1905), rep in/ed in H.
Doc. No. 226, 5 8th Cong., 3 d Sess., at 5-6 (1905).
29. Act ofApril 28, 1904, ch. 1758, § 2, 33 Stat. 429.
30. Instructions from the President to Isthmian Canal Comm. (May 9, 1904), reprinted in
S. Doc. No. 401, vol. 3, 5 9 th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2419 (1907).
31. See ISTHMIAN CANAL COMM., LAWS OF THE CANAL ZONE, ISTHMUS OF PANAMA, Act No. i
of the Isthmian Canal Comm., repmrited in H. Doc. No. 226, 5 8th Cong., 3 d Sess., at 113-18
(1905).
32. Canal Zone v. Coulson, 1 C.Z. Rep. 50 (1907) (No. 28), in 1 CANAL ZONE SIUPREME
CoLRT REPORTS: CASEs AD JUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE CANAL ZONE FROMJULY TERM,
1905 YOOIOBERTERM, 19o8 (gog).
33. Transcript of Record at 67, Coulson v. Govt. of Canal Zone, 212 U.S. 553 (1908) (No.
187). The Governor of the Canal Zone later wrote that the Court agreed to hear the case
because the British Ambassador in Washington had been raising a stink about Coulson's case
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The Solicitor General's brief pointed out that no statute gave the
Supreme Court jurisdiction to review judgments of the Supreme Court of
the Canal Zone by writ of error.4 Coulson responded with a new filing,
seeking leave to petition for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari instead.
Coulson argued that, especially in a capital case involving the "gravest"
constitutional questions about Executive power over the individual, the
Court was empowered by the Constitution to review the judgment of an
inferior tribunal unless Congress had specifically negatived its jurisdiction.vi
Coulson's theory seemed based on Article III and habeas case law rather
than the Suspension Clause as such, but the brief suggested that habeas
corpus is a constitutionally required backstop when no other form of
statutory review is available:@ The Solicitor General responded that Baez had
denied review in similar circumstances, thus reiterating that the Court had
no jurisdiction unless granted by Congress.37
In two memorandum decisions, the Court dismissed the writ of error
"for want of jurisdiction" and denied the motions to file for writs of habeas
corpus and certiorariS We cannot know for sure why the Court did this,
because it did not explain its reasoning. But, in light of the circumstances-
a capital case, pressure from the British ambassador, impassioned argument
by a leading light of the American bar-it is tempting to assume that the
Court would have exercised jurisdiction if it thought the Constitution
required it or even merely allowed it. Read alongside Baez, I am inclined to
see Coulson as evidence that the Court did not believe that the Constitution
required Congress to extend habeas jurisdiction to detainees in
nonsovereign or quasi-sovereign territory.
and the lack of jury trials in the Canal Zone. See GEORGE W. GOETHALs, GOVERNMENT OF THE
CANAL ZONE 1 ( 1915).
34. Motion to Dismiss or Affirm and Brief in Support Thereof at 2, Coulon, 212 U.S. 553
(No. 187).
35. Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 9-11, t6, Couhon, 212 U.S. 553
(No. 187). Note that Coulson's lawyers filed tw~o briefs with this same title. The material cited in
this and the following footnote are from the 16-page brief, not the 3o-page brief with the same
title.
36. Id. at 9-1 1, 15- 16.
37. Brief by United States in Opposition Filed by Leave of Court at 2, 12-13, Coulson, 212
U.S. 553 (No. -).
38. Couson, 212 U.S. 553 (1908) (mem.) (No. 187); In r Couison, 212 U.S. 553 (1908)
(mem.) (No. -).
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